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Abstract
I present a model in which individuals compete for a prize by choosing to
apply or not. Abilities are private information and in attempt to select the
best candidate, the committee compares applicants with an imperfect technol-
ogy. The choice of application cost, size of the prize and use of information
technology are being characterized. In equilibrium, the number of applicants
is stochastic and may overload the committee. I show that in spite of over-
load, the optimal cost (size of the prize) is decreasing (increasing) in market
size. Furthermore I show when having a perfect information technology is not
optimal.
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1 Introduction
Consider a scientic committee that has the task to organize a contest for a research
prize. Having no knowledge of the qualities of potential applicants, the committee
faces the problem of advertising the prize and designing the application procedure
in order to award the best candidate. With only a limited (time) capacity to read
and extract information from the applications, the committee runs the potential risk
of being overloaded with piles of applications, when too many individuals apply. At
the same time, the committee wishes not to discourage applying too much, since in
that case nobody will apply. The problem is thus to design the contest in such a
way that attention will be devoted only to the better candidates in the population,
while ensuring that some people do apply. The scholars know their own quality but
are uncertain about the number of other applicants and their qualities. To decide
whether to apply or not, individuals weigh their chances of winning and the size of
the prize against the trouble of writing the application. To what extent should entry
be troublesome?
It is this interaction that is the subject of this paper: the competition by a number
of privately informed candidates for a single prize, awarded by a committee that has
imperfect ability to rank applicants. This interaction characterizes a number of mar-
kets: examples include recruitment in the labour market, architectural competition,
competition for licences, conference presentations and publications. I will answer the
above question by relating the (optimal) cost of applying to the size of the market
and the available selection technology.
Since the pioneering work of Spence (1973), asymmetric information in the above
markets has been studied quite extensively, especially in the literature on signal-
ing and mechanism design. There are two pillars that virtually all models in the
traditional literature rest on: (i) the uninformed side of the market relies on incen-
tives solely in order to mitigate informational asymmetry and (ii) these incentive
mechanisms, like signaling, require the informed agents to be heterogeneous in some
observable way, being for example their output or education level. Moreover, in the
latter case the individuals cost of sending a certain signal must be correlated to the
hidden information (e.g. ability), to enable separation.
In some markets, like prize competition, these two assumptions do not seem ad-
equate. Turning to the rst, it is widely observed that e¤ort is spent on acquiring
information about trading partners simply by investigating the candidates. For ex-
ample, the assessment of job candidates is a widespread phenomenon. Firms try to
discover ability of applicants by using interviews or assessment centers in their hiring
decisions. In trade, buyers may audit and compare the features of di¤erent sellers.
A program committee of a conference tries to select the best papers by reading the
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papers. 1
Hence, it is plausible that for many types of information asymmetries, the un-
informed uses some kind of information technology to obtain imperfect estimates of
the other side of the market. Using these estimates, di¤erent candidates can then
be compared. It is likely that the uninformed side of the market can hereby improve
its decisions and this practice should be allowed for in a formal model of asymmetric
information.
I now turn to the secondly mentioned pillar, taking education as an example of
a signaling device, as in Spence (1973). I will argue that such a device may not
always work and may leave the problem of asymmetric information unsolved. In the
rst place, when asserted that the cost of education decreases in ability, it is often
overlooked that more able people incur higher opportunity costs of education, due
to unfullled other protable activities. When contented with this assertion, two
additional objections can be made. Firstly, the contest may be specialized in such a
way that the pool of potential applicants is de facto homogeneous. Think for example
about a research grant for Ph.D. students: they all have a university degree and some
working paper ready to send. Thus, sorting by education level may be too crude and
not go far enough. Secondly, the timeframe of a contest does not always allow for
applicants to adjust their (educational) choices to the menu of contracts o¤ered by
a rm. When the scientic committee announces the research prize, contestants will
typically send existing papers, rather than write new ones. In conclusion, in real
world markets costs may not always serve as a sorting device. 2
I present a strategic model in which both aforementioned pillars are relaxed. In my
framework, incentives and technology are both means of dealing with informational
imperfections and I do not require applicants to have di¤erent costs of applying. The
ability of each agent is modelled as an independent draw from a common pool of
abilities. Each individual applicant knows his own ability, but does not know the
abilities of the other applicants, nor the distribution of these rivalsabilities.
The committee strives for awarding the best candidate in the population, that
is, the committee cares about the rank of the winner in the original population and
is ex ante uninformed about individualsabilities. It is thus implicit in my model
that, although qualities are unknown in the selection stage, they matter later on.
The assumption is natural in situations where the merit of the hired candidate is
realized when he or she beatsthe other candidates. The following example claries:
1In an overview article on signaling and screening, Riley (2001) asserts on this point that there is
a strong incentive for the market to seek alternative means of information transmission (for signaling
or screening devices). It is likely that in environments where this is the case, there will be evidence
of direct testing, early monitoring, etc. -all provided to greatly reduce, if not eliminate, asymmetric
information.(p. 474).
2Supporting this assertion, Riley (2001) emphasizes the need for further discussion of equilibrium
in which screening/signaling costs are not perfectly negatively correlated with quality.(p. 475).
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a university seeks to hire a PhD for a PostDoc position. Since publishing takes
time, the quality of recent graduates is relatively hard to observe. After some years,
however, it will become more clear which candidates have research potential, since
time allowed them to publish. At that stage, quality is easier to observe and it is
likely that the largest research funds and international standing can be gained only
if the best candidate was hired.
In a sequential game, the committee announces a contest to a total of T agents.
Participation in this contest is made troublesome by the committee and I denote the
utility cost of applying by c: To control c; the committee can, for example, require
all kinds of formalities to be fullled and numerous documents be sent. Then indi-
viduals decide whether to participate or not and nally, the committee processes N
applications with a selection technology and allocates the award to one candidate.3
The endogenous choice of how many contestants to process must take into account
the imperfect and costly nature of any information processing technology. I capture
this fact by implicitly assuming a constraint on time, budget or attention available
for processing information. More specically, I model the allocation of scarce limited
attention by letting the reliability of the ranking of candidates decrease in the quantity
of applications processed. As a result, a trade-o¤ emerges between including the best
candidate in the investigation and identifying the best candidate. I will call the
decreasing reliability of the ranking technology the overload e¤ect.
My results about equilibrium behaviour in this game are the following. Firstly, to
avoid overload, the contest organizer sometimes chooses to disregard some pieces of
information and thus randomly chooses N applications out of the total number. The
overload e¤ect thus causes the contest organizer to leave unattended some potential
trading alternatives.
Secondly, I nd an equilibrium of favorable selection, in the sense that each
candidate participates if and only if the ability is above some demarcation level.
Separation emerges not due to some cost heterogeneity but due to the fact that
N > 1: the winner is determined by comparison of informative estimates of ability.4
Individuals with higher abilities have higher probabilities of winning and are therefore
easier inclined to incur the cost c; while lower abilities will not nd it worthwhile to
apply. I will label this the selection e¤ect. I thus introduce a new mechanism for a
separating equilibrium to emerge.
Thirdly, the number of participants is stochastic in equilibrium and there is a
risk of delay or breakdown in the contest. It might occur that in equilibrium, no
candidate nds it worthwhile to participate as all candidates perceive their ability
3We abstract from the question whether ignoring applicants is possible, from an institutional
perspective.
4The accuracy may be quite low.
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level as too low, that is, below the demarcation level.
I nally study two design problems. The rst insight is that the selection e¤ect of
c is used to balance the risk of delay and the overload e¤ect. I then analyze how the
demarcation level depends on the market size T and nd that it increases in T; for
xed c: The latter nding implies that the larger the potential market, the smaller the
expected share of the active market. In fact, for some parameters, the expected total
number of applications may actually decrease in the number of potential applicants!
Thus the sheer number e¤ect of market size T is not the only e¤ect to consider
when overload is feared: the competitive e¤ect, due to strategic interaction, works in
the opposite direction: it discourages applying. The above suggests that the risk of
delay becomes an issue for larger markets. Indeed, even though the committee incurs
overload, I nd that the optimal application costs c decrease in the size of the market
T:
Since in some contests not the trouble of applying (c) can be controlled easily,
but committees rather invest in their selection technology, the second design problem
I investigate is whether for xed c and market size T; it is optimal to invest in a
perfect selection technology. The surprising result I nd is that when applying is
troublesome enough, it is not optimal to have a perfect selection technology, even
when this technology has zero costs. The reason is that the risk of delay becomes an
issue when c is high and lowering the accuracy of the selection technology is then a
way to dampen this risk.
The issues in this study relate to several strands in the literature. Firstly, it is
related to the traditional signaling literature. I have already discussed the features
that di¤erentiate my analysis from this eld. The paper that comes closest is Janssen
(2002), who studies competition for a job and the e¤ect of the number of competitors
on signaling activity and the wage the rm sets.
Secondly, another vast area is that of contests and tournaments. A distinction
should be made between mechanisms that have the purpose to select one candidate
out of a group (e.g. whom to hire) and mechanisms that serve to induce a desired
behaviour of all group members (e.g. work hard). The term contestis often under-
stood to include the latter purpose. I should therefore emphasize that I only study
the selection role of contests. For the incentive role I refer to Lazear and Rosen (1981)
and subsequent papers.5
Most papers that study contests as selection devices share the feature that con-
testants provide e¤ort (or make expenditures) that increases their chances of winning
the prize.6 I have argued that a selection procedure does not always allow for con-
5A more recent contribution is Clark and Riis (1998) who study competition over more than one
prize.
6Typically some contest success function is assumed that increases in e¤ort or rent-seeking ex-
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testants to adjust their e¤orts. In my setup, contestants merely decide whether to
apply or not and it excludes e¤ort considerations.
Thirdly, there is some literature that discusses imperfect information acquisition.
A study that comes close to my model is Ficco (2004). His emphasis is on the
conditions for information overload to occur in equilibrium, dened as a situation
in which the number of candidates that applies is larger than the number that will
be processed. An important feature that di¤erentiates it from my work, is that
the distribution of the rivalsabilities is known. Hence, there is no risk that nobody
applies, and consequently the e¤ect of costs to invoke a selection e¤ect is unambiguous
and is not an issue in his model. Malueg and Yongsheng Xu (1997) investigate the
optimal acquisition of information in order to assign a worker to a job. Information
acquisition also plays a role for prospective home buyers, for whom the beliefs of
quality also depend on other consumersdecisions and the time the house has been
on the market. This interaction is analyzed by Taylor (1999).
Finally, there are two ingredients of prize competition that dissociate it from
a typical auction: (i) the (common) value is deterministic and (ii) the committees
main objective is not to raise revenue, but to allocate the prize (contract, licence etc.)
to the best candidate.7 It is also worth noting that auctions may have undesirable
self-selection e¤ects in procurement, as shown by Manelli and Vincent (1995).8
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the ranking of
candidates by using some technology. Section 3 analyses the game and is followed by
Section 4 on contest design. Section 5 relates the market size to the competitiveness
of the market and Section 6 concludes and discusses further work. The lengthier
proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Selection Technology
In this section, I introduce a selection technology, the committees corresponding
preference relation and its use of the selection technology. Consider a population S
with k members. Each member i of this population has a certain ability ai, determined
by an independent random draw from a common pool of abilities. Ability ai is private
information held by agent i and the realization of abilities is unknown.
penditures. Recent contributions are Morgan (2003), who studies sequential expenditures by con-
testants, and Hvide and Kristiansen (2003), who study the degree of risk taking as a strategic
variable.
7Moreover, auction mechanisms are not always available as prices are sometimes xed due to
regulation or other reasons, for example house rents in the Netherlands.
8In spite of these two important di¤erences, a connection with the auction literature can be
made, as there are some papers that study the role of participation cost and the potential number
of bidders, see Levin and Smith (1994) and Menezes and Monteiro (2000). Both studies also nd
that participation should be costly.
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In this section, I abstract from agentsincentives and I assume all k agents apply.
The committee can make N random draws from this set of applying candidates,
denote this sample by XN ; with XN  S. The committee investigates the ability of
all i 2 XN and its decision is to choose a single element from XN .9
One can think of various objectives for a committee to strive for. For example,
to make sure that only candidates that exceed a treshold apply, or to maximize the
expected ability of the winner. Instead, I assume that the objective of the committee
is to maximize the probability that the best candidate will win the prize. As men-
tioned in the Introduction, good arguments can be given for this assumption. The
committee strives for awarding the best candidate and obtains utility uh in that event
and ul if another was awarded, where uh > ul; w.l.o.g. I normalize ul = 0:10
As mentioned above, an important aspect I want to capture, is that the precision
of the investigation depends on N . I introduce an assessment method that suggests
one candidate fromXN as winner. With a certain probability, this candidate is indeed
the best candidate and with the remaining probability this candidate is a random
draw from XN : The following denition is used throughout.
Denition An imperfect selection technology  : N ! [0; 1] suggests a winner.
The probability that the winner is argmaxi2XN faig ; that is, the best candidate, is
 (N) and the probability that the winner is a random draw from XN is 1   (N).
To incorporate the scarce nature of the capacity to process information we assume
that technology  satises one of the two following conditions:
(A)  (N + 1) <  (N) for all N and limN!1  (N) = 0:
(B) For some capacity constraint bN 2 N and constant  2 [0; 1] ;
 (N) =
(
 if N  bN
0 if N > bN :
Technology (A) exhibits the trade-o¤ in quantity and quality of information
processing most straightforwardly, whereas technology (B) is a step-wise approach
and can be the result of outsourcing the test to an assessment center, with whom a
contract
n
; bNo is agreed that species a reliability and a capacity of the test.
The above denition implies that, when k candidates apply andN will be processed,
the probability of awarding the best in S equals:
 (N ; k; )   (N) N
k
+ [1  (N)] 1
k
: (1)
9We assume it is not possible to award a candidate i =2 XN that was not processed.
10In the model, both the preference relation and the technology treat all candidates but the best in
the same way. It can be seen that in a setting where all ranks are selected and evaluated di¤erently,
all the insights of the paper would obtain. Such a setting would only complicate matters needlessly.
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This can be understood as follows. With probability  (N) ; the best in XN will be
chosen and since the best in S is included in XN with probability Nk the rst term
follows. With probability 1   (N), the winner was a random draw from XN and in
this case the probability that the best is drawn is 1
k
:
The trade-o¤ in information processing can now be seen in the rst term: (a) as
more candidates are being assessed the more likely it is that a really good candidate
is amongst them (the fraction N
k
) but as (b) the limited attention is divided over more
applications, the more supercial the assessment will be, obscuring the informative-
ness of every single candidates application ( (N) decreases). Hence, this trade-o¤
is one of processing many alternatives and the informativeness of the investigation.




uh (N ; k; ) (2)
A few observations about the solution can be made. Firstly, since  is a prob-
ability, it exists. Secondly, the solution to the unconstrained problem, say N; is
independent of k and fully determined by : Therefore I can write the solution to (2)
as N = min fk;Ng : N tells the committee how many applications to process at
most. Thirdly, the variable uh has no impact of interest and will therefore be nor-
malized to uh = 1: Finally, since  (2; k; ) >  (1; k; ) ; I have that N > 1: These
results hold for any specication of : In summary:
Lemma 2.1 The committee processes at most N applications, ignoring applica-
tions randomly if necessary, where N is the solution to (2). N is larger than 1,
independent of the number of applications actually received and fully determined by
the selection technology :
The following example illustrates:
Example Suppose  (N) = N g for some g < 0: Then the following are graphs of
















 (N ; 100;  (N)) for  (N) = N 1:07:
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In the above example, N = 15. I thus conclude that imperfect decision making
may require to process a nite amount of information, implying that some sources
are left unattended.
3 The Game
Above we studied the problem of the committee in isolation from applicantsincen-
tives. In this section I introduce the entire game and its equilibrium. There is a pop-







for prize V that costs c to participate in. The timing of events is as follows:
0. The committee determines and announces the contest C.
Nature draws abilities fa1; a2; :::; aTg from a uniform distribution with support
[0; 1] :
1. Each agent i privately learns ai and decides whether to participate (i.e. to
apply) or not. By participating in the contest he incurs cost c:
2. The committee observes the number of applications and decides how many to
investigate, N .
3. The investigation of the committee yields a winner and the prize is awarded.
We will postpone the determination of c=V and  in stage 0 to the next section.
Before analyzing stages 1 and 2 in detail, I introduce a rst result:
Lemma 3.1 Let  (N) > 0: If in an equilibrium of the game a candidate with
ability a0 applies then all candidates with ability ai > a0 apply as well.
Proof. First note that all candidates have the same costs and benets of applying
and that they only di¤er in their chances to win. Hence, I prove the claim by arguing
that the probability to be chosen by the committee increases in true ability ai on
[a0; 1] : The probability to be chosen is equal to the probability to be suggested as
winner by : The winner, in turn, is either determined correctly or by chance. Thus,
the higher the ability, the higher the probability to win. Furthermore, note that
 (N) is independent of ai and then the result follows.
This result implies that there exists a demarcation level  such that a candidate
i applies if and only if ai  : I will now analyze Stages 2 and 1 subsequently. Let
us denote by S  T the subset of candidates that send an application to the contest
organizer in Stage 1, with j S j= k. The contest organizer has to decide in Stage 2
on N; the number of applications to consider. S consists of the k best candidates in
T and Lemma 2.1 applies.
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I now turn to stage 1, the incentive to apply. Due to Lemma 3.1 we can restrict
the quest for equilibrium strategies to those of the form apply if and only if ai  
and I will now investigate how the demarcation level  is determined.11 We have that
k denotes the unknown total number of applications. In determining the expected
payo¤ of applying, the expectation about the number of rivals applying (k   1) will
turn out to play a major role. A potential contestant i with ability ai 2 [0; ] has
to conjecture two uncertain events to decide whether or not to apply: i 2 XN (being
processed) and the event of being selected (being labeled as winner): I now proceed
by investigating how the probability to win for such a type is determined.
First, given that i 2 S; Pr (i 2 XN j i 2 S) = Nk . Second, given that i applies
(i 2 S) and that i will be investigated (i 2 XN), i wins if the test with technology 
suggests him as best candidate.
Consider rst the case 1 < k  N: All k candidates will be processed and thus
agent i will be considered surely. If the winner is determined correctly, he looses for
sure since at least one other candidate applied and this other candidate has a higher
ability. If the winner is determined by chance, he wins with probability 1
k
. Thus, the
probability to win for given k   1 in case all will be processed equals
[1   (k)] 1
k
for 1 < k  N;
and when k > N; then i will be considered with probability N

k
and only N candi-
dates will be processed, hence the probability to win is then:
N
k
[1   (N)] 1
N
for k > N:
Now since, if k = 1; agent i is the only one and wins for sure; we can write the
probability to win for all types ai 2 [0; ] as:
  (; ;N; T ) 
TX
k=1
P (k   1)F (k   1) ; where F (k   1) =
(
1 if k = 1
1 (N)
k
if k > 1
;
(3)
N = min fk;Ng and P (k   1)   T 1
k 1

T k (1  )k 1 denotes the density function
of k   1:
To relate the demarcation  that arises in equilibrium to the other variables of the
model, it is important how   (; ) depends on : When  increases, the probability
that a given rival candidate applies decreases and thus, probability mass shifts to
lower k: How this e¤ects   (; ) depends on the shape of F (k) ; as can been seen
in expression (3). For k > 1 and N > T; we have that F (k   1) = (1   (k)) =k
11Note that we have in fact two kinds of contestant-strategy that are part of an equilibrium:
apply i¤ ai > aand apply i¤ ai  a. The distinction is unimportant.
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and two counterforces are at work: when k decreases, the easier it is to be selected
when the selection is random, but the lower the probability that the selection will be
random since the technology is more accurate for lower k: Thus, both numerator and
denominator of F increase in k: To characterize equilibrium I want   to be monotone,
however. The following assumption resolves this:
Assumption 1 Let k^ = (T   1) (1  ) + 1: Technology  is such that




8 k  k^;




8 k > k^:
It is immediate that a constant technology (type B) always satises this assump-
tion (since  does not vary). For type (A), we have that bk 1 is the expected number
of competitors so this condition requires that, for a non-applying agent, the chance
to win if k   1 is below (above) average is higher (lower) than the chance to win if
k   1 is average.12 The assumption allows us to show:
Lemma 3.2 The probability   (; ;N; T ) increases in :
The following Theorem characterizes the equilibrium for the game.
Theorem 3.3 (i) Suppose (1   (N)) =T < c=V < 1; then in every subgame
perfect equilibrium of the game, only agents with ability ai   apply, where  > 0
is the unique solution to
  (; ;N; T ) = c=V: (4)
(ii) Suppose that c=V  (1   (N)) =T: Then an equilibrium in which all agents
apply exists.
In both cases the committee processes at most a nite number of applications, which
is fully determined by .
Proof. In Lemma 3.1 I have demonstrated the existence of a demarcation level 
as stated. Furthermore, the uniqueness of the solution   (; ;N; T ) = c=V follows
from Lemma 3.2.
(i) I proceed by showing that in every equilibrium: (a)  > 0 and (b) the determina-
tion of demarcation level  as in (4).
(a) When every candidate applies ( = 0), the probability distribution P (m) col-
lapses such that all probability mass shifts to m = T   1; hence   (0; ;N; T ) =
(1   (N)) =T < c=V; from which it follows that a sender with ai = "; for small
12Technologies characterized by a very steep decrease of  (the ability to select the best deteriorates
very fast in the number processed) might not satisfy this assumption. What   (; ) might look like
in that case is left as an exercise.
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" > 0; is strictly better o¤ by not applying, yielding a contradiction.
(b) Denote the demarcation level by ea. We will rule out the situations
  (ea; ;N; T ) < c=V and   (ea; ;N; T ) > c=V: The rst implies that ea is strictly
better o¤ by not applying and the second point implies that all in [0;ea] apply. Both
points contradict the fact that ea is a demarcation level.
(ii) That an equilibrium with all T candidates applying exists easily follows.
I note that non-applying agents have the same incentive to apply as the candidate
with ability level . The reason for this is the following. Incentives to apply are
constant in ai for ai <  as low-ability people can only be chosen if the winner is
determined by chance or if k = 1, and hence, their winning is independent of their
true ability. I therefore assign a strategy to low-ability people not to apply, although
they do not have a strict incentive to do so, namely they are indi¤erent, as agent 
would be. I have shown that this prole of strategies is the only subgame perfect
equilibrium prole.
The equilibrium proposed above shows how information asymmetry can be over-
come, when the market does not allow for signaling. Because the uninformed com-
pares 2 or more candidates (with a precision that may be quite low), the higher types
have a higher probability of winning. As a result, only the higher types are willing to
incur the participation costs and separation is induced. I will label this the selection
e¤ect of participation costs c:
In what follows I characterize the contest design. Since variations in c and  will
have no e¤ect on the incentive to apply as long as c=V  (1   (N)) =T; I will focus
on the properties of the equilibrium described under (i) of the Theorem, rather than
(ii).
4 Contest Design
In this section I consider two design problems: (i) for given market size and selection
technology, how troublesome should applying be made and (ii) for given market size
and cost of applying, is it optimal to have a perfect selection technology ?
Since what matters in equilibrium condition (4) is the ratio c=V , all my results on
c can be applied to V as well.13 For simplicity, we normalize V = 1: The committees
objective function is given by:
U (c; ;T ) 
NX
k=1
P (k;) (k; k; ) +
TX
k=N+1
P (k;) (N; k; ) ;
where, with a slight change in notation from (3), P (k; ) denotes the probability that
13This is the case to the extent that V is not a transfer.
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k out-of T apply. There is a probability that no one applies (k = 0) and when that
happens, the contest is delayed. I will label this the risk of delay and the payo¤ in
that event is normalized to 0:14
For k  1 the above expression can be understood by recalling that when k agents
apply, the probability to award the winner is  () ; as was elucidated in (1). Note
that when k > N; the test capacity is overloaded and then the best candidate might
not be considered, and I will label this the overload e¤ect.
In the remainder of the paper I will study the interaction between the selection
e¤ect, the overload e¤ect and the risk of delay to characterize the optimal design of
the contest. First observe that Lemma 3.2 and equilibrium equation (4) imply that
@
@c
> 0: This leaves us with investigating one other variable, market size T:
For an individual candidate, the number of potential competitors a¤ects the
chance of winning. First, recall that a type ai 2 [0; ] can only win if the test
picks up a candidate randomly. Then, as T increases, for given demarcation  more
candidates apply, and the discussion that proceeds assumption 1 is again relevant:
the increase in k makes it more di¢ cult to be selected if selection is random, but
increases the probability that the selection is in fact random. The latter e¤ect stim-
ulates low-ability types to apply. By assumption 1 the rst e¤ect dominates and
consequently I can show:
Lemma 4.1 The demarcation level  increases in T:
We now use this result to characterize the two design problems.
Designing c
For a given technology ; I relate the optimal cost c to the market size T: If the
demarcation level  would be independent of T; one might conclude that, since for
given ; k increases in T; optimal cost increase in T: The intuition would be that
the larger the market, the more troublesome applying should be, in order to avoid
overload. However, since Lemma 4.1 shows that  does depend on T; this reasoning
lacks the strategic e¤ect of the market size. To accurately incorporate the fact that
U (c; ;T ) depends on T via  as well as directly via P (k; ) ; I resort to a type (B)
technology:15 Doing so, I nd that:
Proposition 4.2 Suppose that the selection technology is of type (B). There existe  1 such that if  < e; then c (T + 1) < c (T ) for all T:
The above Proposition demonstrates that the strategic e¤ect of T inverts the logic
that in larger markets it should be more troublesome to apply: even though overload
constitutes a problem, application cost should decrease in market size!
14The dynamic process of delay and the resulting updating of information is left out of the model.
15The di¢ culty with a type (A) technology is that   contains a sum.
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Designing 
It can easily be veried that when N > T and  = 1 (perfect information
acquisition), c (T ) = 0 for all T: In many prize competitions however, the utility
cost of applying cannot be controlled to that extent. Therefore, I now look at the
design of  : this variable can be controlled by investing time and budget in the
selection technology. When c is given, I investigate whether it is optimal to have
perfect information acquisition:
Proposition 4.3 There exists ec < 1; such that if c > ec; the committee prefers an
imperfect selection technology over a perfect one with  = 1 and N > T .
To give an idea about what the level of ecmight be, I computed it for a market with
T = 50 potential applicants: when the utility cost of applying for the prize amounts to
more than 20% of the value of winning it, the committee prefers having an imperfect
selection technology to a perfect one! The reason is that a very accurate selection
technology works discouraging and by lowering it, the risk of delay is dampened.
Note that the result does not require the technology to be costly.
5 Market Size
The analysis above shows how a committee best balances the risk of receiving too
many applications with the risk of receiving no applications. Surprisingly, when the
market size increases and the information technology is poor (low ), the selection
e¤ect of c should not be used to discourage applications, but to encourage them.
Indeed, when information acquisition is perfect, participation cost c should be zero.
Conversely, when c cannot be that low, information acquisition should not be perfect.
This points out that the risk of market break down might increase with market size
and invalidates the commonly held belief that the more players there are, the more
competitive the outcome will be.
Since additionally, perfect information acquisition is believed to enable lush com-
petition, I will in this section use the model to investigate the hypothesis that having
perfect information and a large number of competitors will lead to a competitive
outcome. We denote by E (k j c; T ) the expected number of applications:
Proposition 5.1 Let  () be of type (B) with  = 1:
(i) The risk of break down P (0; ) increases in T ;
(ii) For all nite T; there exist bc (T ) < 1 such that E (k j c; T ) > limT!1E (k j c; T )
for c 2 (bc (T ) ; 1]:
The proposition shows that having a larger market does not imply having a more
competitive outcome (understood as the expected number of participants), even when
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processing capacity is unbounded. This is a relevant insight for those designing
markets. Applied to the labour market, the above implies that in times of high
unemployment, people could actually apply less in the aggregate, due to the low
expectations they have about their chances of being accepted!
My result corresponds to ndings in the consumer search literature in which the
expected price is related to the number of rms in the market. Janssen and Moraga-
Gonzalez (2004) show for example that an increase in the number of rms may lead
to an increase in the expected price. In their study, some consumers engage in costly
search for prices, others are fully-informed and rms randomize their price. Now
when the number of rival rms increases, it becomes less likely to be the lowest-
priced rm (i.e. to win the competition for selling to the informed consumers) and
in that case a rm can be better o¤ by targeting the consumers that search for one
price only, instead of targeting the fully-informed consumers. Hence, the expected
price increases.
6 Concluding Remarks
A model of prize competition was presented. My model intends to describe markets
where the contest is specialized in such a way that the applicants cannot be sorted
on the basis of heterogenous variables. I show that in this case, the uninformed
market side nds an alternative means of information acquisition: directly comparing
candidates by some technology. As a result, better candidates are more likely to win
and separation is induced. A novel feature for the traditional asymmetric information
literature is that both technology and incentives reduce informational asymmetry. My
model thus lls the gap in markets where the traditionally studied mechanisms are
not applicable.
The technology is imperfect and as a result, resources will not be spend on every
application received. This resembles the practice in selection procedures in which
numerous applications are rst ranked on rather trivial, uninformative attributes
and consequently, costly interviews are given to a select few.
The nature of information asymmetry I use deserves some discussion. In my
setup, besides not knowing which candidate has which ability (as in most models),
it is also unknown whether there is an applicant out there with ability above some
given level.16 For an applicant, knowing her own ability, this implies that she does not
know whether a better candidate considers applying. Especially in those situations
where the population of potential applicants is not too small (in that case people may
know each other too well) one cannot be sure that one of the applicants possesses
any pre-specied ability.
16Again, as exception, I have this feature in common with Janssen (2002).
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The nding that there is a positive probability that nobody applies, is driven
by the fact that realizations of ability are unknown. As argued above, for many
markets, not requiring players to know the distribution is appropriate, and hence,
the contingency that no one applies is an important one. A contest designer must
simply take into account that it might happen that nobody nds it worthwhile to
apply: all agents perceive their chance of winning too low compared to the prize. If
no one applies, information about abilities in the population is revealed and lower
quality candidates are encouraged to apply. This dynamic process, which is left out
of the theoretical model, delays the contest.
The variables c and V of the model are not treated as transfers but instead
incurred, resp. enjoyed, only by the agents. They lend themselves therefore for
various, non-monetary interpretations. The cost parameter c for example, can be
seen as the trouble of collecting the application documents and the value of the prize
V can be seen as prestige. In case of journal submissions, the cost c can be seen as
the waiting time for an editorial decision.
The above mentioned selection and overload e¤ects and risk of delay were analyzed
and showed that the actual level of competition may vary with market size in an
unanticipated way. Insights about optimal contest design that we obtained are rstly,
that the larger the market, the easier applying should be, in order to mitigate the
discouraging e¤ect of competition. This e¤ect of market size dominates the potential
overload of applications. Secondly, when the utility cost of applying is xed and high
enough, an accurate selection technology also discourages applicants. In that case, it
is in the interest of the committee to have a less than perfect technology.
Besides the typical contests for prizes and contracts, these insights can be applied
to the allocation of public assets, such as frequencies and licences for example, when
they are procured via a beauty contest rather than via an auction. In this light, I
should emphasize that the committees sole objective in this model is to allocate the
prize to the best possible candidate, rather than revenue maximization. A comparison
of the two mechanisms constitutes an avenue for future research.
Appendix
We investigate the impact on   () of marginal changes in  and T :
Lemma 3.2 The probability   (; ;N; T ) increases in :




> 0 for m < bm
= 0 for m = bm
< 0 for m > bm; where bm = (T   1) (1  ) : (5)
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Let P 0 = @P (m;)
@

















P 0 + (1  F (bm)) @P (0; )
@
= (1  F (bm)) @P (0; )
@
> 0;
now since F (bm) < 1 this inequality holds. This completes the proof.
Lemma 4.1 The demarcation level  increases in T:
Proof. A change in T changes only the probability distribution and the possible
values m can take. Therefore, let us denote the distribution of m when there are






T 1 m (1  )m ;
eP (m) = T
m

T m (1  )m = T
T  mP (m) ;
hence
  (; ;N; T + 1) =
N 1X
m=1







eP (m)(1   (N))
m+ 1

+ eP (T ) 1   (N)
T + 1
+ P (0) ;
and thus we need to show that
  (; ;N; T + 1)    (; ;N; T ) =
N 1X
m=1






h eP (m)  P (m)i(1   (N))
m+ 1

+ eP (T ) 1   (N)
T + 1
  (1  )P (0) < 0
Now note that eP (m)   P (m) = m (1 )T
T m P (m) such that the coe¢ cients on F (m)
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are negative for smallm and positive for largem: Indeed, we can use the same method
as in Lemma 3.2, employing again (5) and Assumption 1.
A su¢ cient condition for the inequality above is then:
bmX
m=1
h eP (m)  P (m)iF (bm) + T 1X
m=bm+1
h eP (m)  P (m)iF (bm)+
+ eP (T ) 1   (N)
T + 1
  (1  )P (0) < 0
Repeatedly rewriting of LHS we get:
F (bm) T 1X
m=1
h eP (m)  P (m)i+ eP (T ) 1   (N)
T + 1







+ eP (T ) 1   (N)
T + 1
  (1    F (bm))P (0)
= eP (T )1   (N)
T + 1




= F (T ) < F (bm) this inequality is satised.
The next two statements are on contest design. For easy reference, we state the
objective function for a type (B) technology:
U (c; ;T ) = 



























Proposition 4.2 Suppose that the selection technology is of type (B). There existse  1 such that if  < e; then c (T + 1) < c (T ) for all T:
Proof. Take the rst-order condition w.r.t.  for a maximum of U :































The proof consists of three steps.
Step (1).









(1  )k T k and byH (T ) =PTN+1  Tk (1  )k T k Nk   1 :
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We then obtain that (6) implies:
c (T ) = (1  )G (T ) +   T 1   T + 
T
H (T ) :
Step (2).








(1  )k T k = TPTk=1  Tk 1k  1  k : Now let z = 1  ; then we get:

























































(1 + x)T   1
x
dx:























Using this expression, take the rst-order condition w.r.t.  :
@U
@
=  TT 1 + (1  ) dG
d







T [+ (1  ) y]T 1 (1  y)  TT 1

+H (T ) = 0 )
  T 1 + 
T









dy [+ (1  ) y]T 1 =)
(1  )G (T   1)  T 1 + 
T
H (T ) = (1  ) 1  
T
T (1  )
Hence, f.o.c. (6) when the market size equals T implies that:
c (T ) = (1  )G (T   1) + 
T
H (T ) :
Step (3).
Now, when convenient, denote by  (T ) the level of  that satises the f.o.c. when
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the market volume is T: From Steps (1) and (2) we know:
c (T ) = (1  )G (T;  (T )) +   T 1   T +  
T
H (T )
c (T + 1) = (1  )G (T;  (T + 1)) + 
T + 1
H (T + 1) :
Thus, to prove the result we will show that:
(1  )G (T;  (T )) +   T 1   T +  
T
H (T ) >
(1  )G (T;  (T + 1)) + 
T + 1
H (T + 1) or
G (T;  (T )) G (T;  (T + 1)) > 
1  

H (T + 1)
T + 1










TT 1  H due to (6). Since 
1  increases,
we have that @G
@
goes to zero when  goes to zero. This, in turn, implies that when
 goes to zero, G (T;  (T )) goes to the maximum of G w.r.t. : Now since  (T + 1)
is di¤erent from  (T ) in a discrete way, we can conclude that there exists a ^ such
that LHS of the latter inequality is positive for all 0    ^: Finally, since the
RHS equals zero for  = 0; we can conclude that there exists e > 0 such that the
inequality holds for all  2 [0; e] : This completes the proof.
Proposition 4.3 There exists ec < 1; such that if c > ec; the committee prefers an
imperfect selection technology over a perfect one with  = 1 and N > T .
Proof. We will investigate @U=@ in the point  = 1 and N > T; and use the
same notation as in the previous proof. We need to show that:
@U
@




(1  ) +H + @H
@
 < 0
Since N > T; the last two terms vanish and then substituting  = 1 we get
1   ()T   T ()T 1 @
@
 G < 0: (7)
First, we investigate @
@
: The demarcation  depends on  via, (4) and we thus use
















: Inequality (7) thus becomes













1   : (8)

















T [+ (1  ) y]T 1 (1  y)  TT 1

:
Label LHS and RHS of (8) by LHS () and RHS () ; respectively. We will now show









By applying lHopitals rule once we get that lim!1 1 
T 1
1  = T   1; showing that
RHS (1) = 1:













1  and by applying lHopitals rule twice we obtain that
the limit equals dRHS
d
(1) = T=2:
Due to points (i) and (ii) there exists 0 < 1 such that (8) holds for all  > 0
and the fact that  monotonically increases in c implies the existence of ec as stated.
Proposition 5.1 Let  () be of type (B) with  = 1:
(i) The risk of break down P (0; ) increases in T ;
(ii) For all nite T; there exist bc (T ) < 1 such that E (k j c; T ) > limT!1E (k j c; T )
for c 2 (bc (T ) ; 1]:
Proof. (i) In equilibrium,  (T )T 1 = c and hence P (0; ) =  (T )T =  (T ) c:
Now since RHS increases in T; LHS must increase in T as well.





: Write this as T
1=[1 (c)1=(T 1)] and note that both numerator and





1  c1=(T 1) >   ln (c) :
First observe that both sides are decreasing in c: Then we will prove by showing that








and LHS (1) = RHS (1) and thus the inequality is satised in a left neighbourhood
of c = 1:
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